Pivot of American foreign policy and the future of Eurasian integration

US Vice President Kamala Harris. / Getty

US Vice President Kamala Harris. / Getty

Editor’s Note: Bradley Blankenship is an American journalist, political analyst and independent reporter based in Prague. The article reflects the views of the author and not necessarily those of CGTN.

On August 24, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris made her scathest comments on China in a speech in Singapore designed to present the current administration’s full pivot to East Asia .

Calling the region “extremely important to the security and prosperity of our country,” the United States appears to be completely changing course to maintain its global hegemony by trying to contain Russia and China, as it tries to contain Russia and China. complete the end of their military adventurism in the Middle East. seen with its recent (and controversial) withdrawal from Afghanistan, which is sometimes seen as part of that region.

This marks a historic geopolitical shift, as it has come full circle in the so-called “global war on terror”, to which Afghanistan was a part, which was sparked by the September 11 terrorist attacks and ushered in the beginning. a new American strategic focus nucleus, namely the American pivot towards East Asia. This policy began several years ago, but we are now entering its peak.

This policy in East Asia is part of Washington’s main objective to counter the integration of Eurasia.

Washington’s dilemma today is the fundamental question of geopolitics, dating back to its founding. As Sir Halford John Mackinder had argued in 1904 when presenting his seminal article “The Geographical Pivot of History”, the emphasis the British Empire placed at the time on naval power – the club of its hegemony world – would be emptied of its meaning with a sufficient development of land transport. which could integrate Eurasia, what he called “the island-world”.

The historical parallel evident here is the United States, its reliance on naval power and military supremacy on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass relative to China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which seeks to build infrastructure. to integrate Eurasia and the world.

Countering the integration of this “island world” must be done in a way that prevents the United States from dispersing too much – mainly by avoiding a conflict on two fronts with Russia and China, two great powers at the heart of the country. ‘Eurasia, since Washington no longer has the capacity to win such a conflict.

An American flag flies above the White House in Washington, DC, the United States, Jan. 22, 2021. / Getty

An American flag flies above the White House in Washington, DC, the United States, Jan. 22, 2021. / Getty

In dealing with this situation, Washington faces a unique and unprecedented set of challenges, as highlighted in a recent article by National interest by A. Wess Mitchell, former Deputy Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.

He said: “Rather than trying to contain Russia and China simultaneously, the United States needs to find a way to stage its competitions with these two powers to ensure that they do not face the two in same time in a war, “he said. could theoretically be achieved in three ways: detente with Russia, postponing competition with China or co-opting both through win-win policies in common forums.

The problem, he notes, is that none of the historical examples to draw upon in any of these options quite match the current situation facing Washington’s imperial planners.

Instead, he essentially advocates a version of Option 1 aimed at pulling Russia out of an unsuccessful two-front war by “making Russia less of a European power – and more of an Asian power.” This, he believes, could be achieved by playing on perceived fears of overdependence on Russia and potential subordination to China.

While this may indeed be a point on which American diplomacy must play, it remains to be seen whether this fear is in fact as big a motivator as people like Mitchell believe – and whether or not Russia’s leaders think it is. ‘Emboldening American world hegemony in anyway is actually desirable or necessary, which I suspect is not. (Mitchell’s analysis also leaves out the potential for a third front with a major regional power in the Middle East, Iran, as tensions between Washington and Tehran erupt.)

As for what was included in Mitchell’s article, it appears to some extent that President Joe Biden’s administration is pursuing this plan that was seen during the summit between Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

We saw at this summit what openings could be for points of mutual interest, such as cybersecurity and arms control. But these are, to put it bluntly, obvious points of mutual interest that are unlikely to lead to a meaningful realignment – at least not at a time that would fit within Washington’s window of opportunity.

On the other hand, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan itself offers Russia and China a serious opportunity to cooperate to maintain security and stability in that country and in the Central Asian region, as well as promote the integration of Eurasia.

(If you would like to contribute and have specific expertise, please contact us at [email protected])

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